Rorty’s Interpretation of Objective Truth Concept: New Type of a Guardianship
Shahera Sharaf, University of Damascus - Syria.
Abstract
This paper discusses Rorty’s interpretation of objective truth concept, and the relevant notions, such as, “essence” as referring to the intrinsic nature of the object; “representation” as a correspondence to reality; “objectivity” as referring to mind-independent reality; and “rationality” as defining reason a unique path to knowledge. The paper also studies the notions’ consequences which are the reason why Rorty discarded such notions. Then, it addresses how the interpretation ended up to impose democratic cultural libralism to other cultures.
Rorty did not only refuse the traditional notions, but he also gave them an interpretation far from their traditional meanings. Accordingly, he shared existentialism and deconstructionism with anti-essentialism which abandons all essences, adopting a practical point of view from anti-representationalism. In addition, he interprets objectivity as "unforced agreement" among scientific researchers, rationality as an open-mindedness and an inclination to talk to other people.
Rorty rejected the exceptional role attributed to scientists, in order not to turn them into a new kind of priests, redeemers, or intermediates as a result of their success. He also rejected to throw out knowledge from some domains, in order to exclude them. Thus, Rorty gave a new meaning enabling human beings to be self-reliant.
The paper also detects the exceptional role of democratic cultural liberalism, as conceived by Rorty, which led, in fact, into a new kind of exclusionism, or new kind of mandate, especially through ethnocentrism.