

The British Stance on the Arab Emirates in the North of the Arabian Peninsula during the First World War 1914-1918

Ghazi Fanatel Al-Atnah*

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Abstract

This study deals with a significant historical subject, focusing on the British stance towards the Arab Emirates in the north of the Arabian Peninsula during the First World War, particularly in relation to the British Conflict with the Ottoman Empire. The primary goal for Britain was to end the Ottoman presence in the region and counter the influence of local forces in the north of the Arabian Peninsula. To achieve this objective, Britain employed a combination of both cooperative and coercive methods.

Furthermore, the study explores the support from the people of the north of the Arabian Peninsula for the Great Arab Revolt, a movement aimed at liberating and elevating the status of the Arabs. The revolution had the potential to succeed in its aims if not for Britain's failure to honor its promises to the Arabs.

This study aims to understand the nature of the British position on the Arab Emirates in the north of the Arabian Peninsula during the First World War and assess the consequences of this stance on the region and the Arabian Peninsula as a whole. Additionally, the study aims to elucidate the British plan to assert control over the entire Arab East and understand the circumstances and conditions surrounding the north of the Arabian Peninsula during the First World War. It also examines the reaction of the local forces towards the British intervention.

The significance of this research lies in its examination of British policies towards the local forces in the north of the Arabian Peninsula during the First World War and the responses of these forces. It fills a gap in the existing literature, as most writings have primarily focused on the Najd and Makkah regions, paying little attention to the northern Arabian Peninsula.

Keywords: ottoman Empire, Colonial Britain, Emirate of hail.

Introduction

This study presents a historical topic of great interest, which is the British position on the Arab Emirates in the north of the Arabian Peninsula during the First World War; this position came amid the Conflict between the Ottoman Empire and colonial Britain and the unbridled desire of Britain to end the Ottoman presence in the Arabian Peninsula and then imposed its control over the region that was of great importance to it.

To achieve this, this study adopted methods of historical writing, descriptive research, data collection, as well as classification of results, and analysis of historical events.

As for the time dimension that was chosen, the First World War (1914-1918), which is of great importance due to the occurrence of major events during this period that had a profound impact on the history of the northern Arabian Peninsula and its neighboring regions.

Preamble

The Ottoman Empire had a clear political presence in the north of the Arabian Peninsula. The state took care of this region, and was keen on its security, because it is a crossing point for convoys heading to the Hijaz. Those convoys, which was one of the most important duties of the state, are to secure their safe arrival to their destination, and to secure their return from whence they came in peace as well.

One of the manifestations of the Ottoman Empire interest in the region was the establishment of a number of Ottoman castles and providing them with soldiers, in order to assert its influence in the region, and to protect convoys from bandits, and from the attacks of tribes, some of whose men used to loot and loot as a way of life.

In the region, in addition to the Emirate of Al Rashid in Hail, the Emirate of Al Shaalan in Al Jawf was found, which was administratively affiliated with the Wali of the Levant in Damascus, while the rest of the northern parts of the Arabian Peninsula belonged to the Governor of Medina.

The influence of the Ottoman Empire in the north of the Arabian Peninsula increased after the establishment of the Hejaz Railway, especially that this railway created a new situation for the region that it had not been familiar with before. to educate parents. From an economic point of view, the railway has contributed to an increase in the products imported from the Levant to the region, and an increase in the region's agricultural products that are sold in the

Levant markets. After commercial exchanges depended on barter, it switched to the use of money in buying and selling.

The majority of the people of the north of the Arabian Peninsula were tribes that moved from place to place in the region in search of pasture and water, and the harshness of life prompted some of these tribes to rely on the invasion to secure their needs, attacking some villages, and some stations located on the railways. The Ottomans Empire pay the tribal sheikhs money in return for implementing its policy of maintaining the security of the region.

The Ottoman Empire was aware of the importance of the Arab Emirates in the north of the Arabian Peninsula, and it sought to assert its authority in the region through its princes, especially that they knew its geography, paths and paths from the state itself, and therefore supported them financially and morally, and made their administrative and financial link closely with its officials in each of the governorate of Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah and Wilayat al-Sham.

And when the ambitions of the European countries in the property of the Ottoman Empire began to unfold, they sought to prevent any interference that the European countries might make to the princes of the region, and at the same time sought to control these princes so that they would not contact the European forces hostile to them.

When the First World War broke out in Europe, the Ottoman Empire felt that it was not far from the conflict, and realized that its participation in the war on the side of the central countries was more beneficial for it, because the Allied countries had ambitions in the property of the Ottoman Empire, and Britain, one of the Allied countries, had influence in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, where it had a large military and political presence in the Arabian Gulf region, and it was occupying Egypt, and controlling the Suez Canal near the north of the Red Sea.

When the Ottoman Empire decided to enter the war against the allies, it began preparing for that, and what it had done in the north of the Arabian Peninsula supported its forces there, and prompted the princes of the region to support it.

Britain realized the importance of the Arabian Peninsula in the nineteenth century A.D., not only to secure the road to India, which was described as the jewel of the British crown but also to maintain the roads leading to it through the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. For this reason, Britain resisted the Ottoman Empire, which had control over the region, and began to seek to achieve its colonial goals and interests, not only by resisting the Ottoman influence but also through the influence of other powers that looked to the region for their interests as well, such as France. As a result, a political and military conflict occurred

between Britain and France over the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea in the shadow of Ottoman weakness. Britain eventually managed to get France out of Egypt, the Red Sea.¹ And the Arabian Gulf enabled it to control the Red Sea and subject the Aden region to its direct influence.²

Britain confirmed its colonial presence on the Arabian Gulf coast through indirect control by linking most of the princes and sheiks of the region with treaties that guaranteed Britain alone influence and put the region's rulers in a position where they could not establish any political or commercial relations except in accordance with what they achieve its interests.³

When the Ottoman-German rapprochement increased in the late nineteenth century AD, Britain found that this rapprochement threatened its interests in the Arabian Gulf because Germany also had colonial goals that it wanted to achieve at the expense of British interests. Therefore it worked to resist German influence in the Ottoman Empire.⁴

As for the north of the Arabian Peninsula, Britain had no interests in it, just as it had no interests in the internal lands of the Arabian Peninsula, and therefore did not interfere in these areas, especially since its intervention would have unwelcome consequences in its relationship with the Ottoman Empire.⁵ Britain was following up on what was happening in the interior regions through its political agents in the Arabian Gulf and the British Consulate in Jeddah. They were monitoring all the military and political movements taking place in the Gulf and Hejaz, and they conveyed its news to the British Embassy in Astana, which was following up on the prevailing situation in the region, and giving instructions directed to it by the London government regarding what affects British interests.⁶

To achieve its goals, Britain began at the beginning of the twentieth century to send several soldiers to see the internal situation in the Arabian Peninsula, especially in its northern region, to find its strengths and weaknesses. This region has given most of its attention because it is closest to its interests in the Arabian Gulf, Iraq, and the Red Sea, and knowing its conditions helps it implement its plans, as it can use that knowledge to establish relations with the powers under the Ottoman Empire, and exploit these relations against them at the appropriate time.⁷

British policy towards the Arab Emirates in the north of the Arabian Peninsula

The successive events, the prevailing atmosphere in Europe, and its colonial countries' desire to carve out parts of the Ottoman Empire led Britain to think that it would be wise to contact the princes of the northern Arabian Peninsula, so

she sent Mrs. Gertrude Bell.⁸ To contact Ibn Rashid, the Prince of Hail, who, by virtue of his position, could threaten British interests in the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and Iraq, if the Ottoman Empire ordered him to do so. Mrs. Bell arrived in Hail on February 25, 1914.⁹

The available documents did not show any results for her visit. Which made some indication that the Emirate of Hail was not among the areas targeted by Britain's efforts after the outbreak of the war in Europe¹⁰. Which erupted five months after Bell's trip to Hail, and Britain expected in early October of 1914 that the Ottoman Empire would join the hostile side, and therefore began making plans to confront this possibility. One of the first things she did was to ascertain the positions of the princes of the Arabian Peninsula and the sheikhs of the tribes if war broke out between them and the Ottoman Empire¹¹.

It seems that the British authorities, after Mrs. Bell's trip, refrained from trying with the Emirate of Hail because they were convinced that it was futile¹². In return, it tried to win the Emirate of Al-Jawf, as Britain sent the political officer Shakespeare¹³ to Al-Jawf in October of 1914, he met the Emir of Al-Jawf, but he did not receive a response from him. Thus, Britain did not achieve much success in luring the princes of the northern Arabian Peninsula to its side at that stage of the war, especially the Emir of Hail, to secure the risks expected from them.¹⁴

The position of the princes of the north of the peninsula prompted Britain to turn towards Abdul Aziz Al Saud; perhaps his position would be different, as it sent Shakespeare to him to persuade him not to provide any military services to the Ottoman forces¹⁵, and an attempt to push him to fight Ibn Rashid, with a desire to weaken the power of the Ottoman Empire by fighting its loyalists¹⁶.

Britain did not expect much from Abdul Aziz Al Saud, knowing that he did not prioritize its interests over his own. Meanwhile, Sharif Hussein bin Ali led the Arab nationalist movement against the Ottoman Empire; Britain realized that its success in winning his favor would win the affection of the Arab national movement and its sympathizers, such as Amir al-Jawf. I found that endorsing this movement would be beneficial to the achievement of the British colonial strategy¹⁷.

The British ambassador in Astana had announced on September 4, 1914, his approval of a plan to support and organize an Arab movement against the Ottoman Empire if it took a hostile stance from Britain, and its war became inevitable, indicating that British support for the Arabs must exist, whether directly or indirectly.¹⁸ Britain exploited the aspirations of Sharif Hussein bin Ali, his resentment against the Ottoman Empire, and his desire for Arab liberation from it and realized the importance of Sharif Hussein bin Ali and his position in the Islamic world as one of the families of the house that all Muslims

respect and revere, especially since he is the Emir of Mecca, which includes the Qiblah of Muslims, as it is in a geographical location that, with the cooperation of the tribes in the region, can confuse the Ottoman forces on the Red Sea coast and in Yemen, which will negatively affect the Ottoman authorities in the Arabian Peninsula¹⁹. In light of these considerations, Britain sent an envoy to Sharif Hussein bin Ali at the end of September 1914 to inquire about his position if the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany²⁰. Thus, Britain anticipated the events and began to survey the positions of the Arab princes to appreciate their importance in its war with the Ottoman Empire, if it rose or neutralized them. Thus, Britain anticipated the events and began surveying the positions of the Arab princes to appreciate their importance in its war with the Ottoman Empire, if it rose or neutralized them²¹. Britain aimed to win the Emir of Mecca to reduce the impact of the Ottoman Sultan's call for jihad against the allies²². And she did not lose sight while she was doing these endeavors that the Arab countries constituted the most significant part of the property of the Ottoman Empire, and removing these countries from them meant achieving a great victory over the Ottoman authorities in the region, which would bring great benefits to Britain during the war²³.

The start of World War I, and the participation of the Ottoman Empire in it against Britain, played a role in highlighting the true face of Britain's policy in the region. This policy was based on creating a kind of mistrust between the Ottoman Empire on the one hand and the Arab princes and reform leaders on the other hand²⁴, Britain sought to open an Arab front within the property of the Ottoman Empire through the alliance of some Arab princes with it, which would drain a large part of the Ottomans' military and political efforts, and harm the position of the Ottoman Empire within the Arabian Peninsula, which affects the movement of its military forces to support the Ottoman forces in Iraq and the Levant or against the Suez Canal²⁵. And obstructing any efforts to unite the forces represented by the Ottoman authorities and the Arab princes in the region to confront the British threat²⁶.

When Britain found that Sharif Hussein bin Ali might ally with it to achieve the liberation aspirations of the Arabs, it made promises that it would help the Arabs to establish an independent Arab state²⁷. Britain's promise to establish an Arab state was only a means to push the Arabs to participate in the war on the side of the allies, and Britain viewed the princes of the northern peninsula as tribal sheikhs, each representing himself only²⁸.

Britain had established the Arab Office in Cairo in order to contact Sharif Hussein bin Ali and support his movement²⁹.

Before Hussein bin Ali announced the revolution against the Ottoman Empire, the British government thought about tightening the siege on the coasts

of the Red Sea.³⁰ However, it retreated from that in support of Sharif, fearing that this siege would anger the region's people and perhaps withdraw their consent for the revolution against the Ottoman Empire. As if reversing the siege was the best way to deal with the people of the area who resisted a British ship as soon as it approached Duba in December 1915³¹.

Thus, it is clear that Britain has sought to eliminate the Ottoman Empire and its presence in the region by stirring up strife between the Arabs and the Ottoman Empire, and the British did not lack the means to achieve the goal of separating the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire, not only did she contact the Emir of Mecca, but she contacted the tribal sheikhs in the region as well, such as the sheikh of the tribes of Bali Suleiman bin Rafada, with whom I contacted in April 1915³².

Britain was aware of the importance of the princes of the north of the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab tribes in the region to the Ottoman authorities because in their cooperation with the Ottoman Empire, they would harm British interests in the Arabian Peninsula itself and in the neighboring regions such as Iraq, the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, Palestine, and Egypt. In addition to these princes, Sharif Hussein bin Ali, with his religious position, constitutes an important link with the region's princes and the sheikhs of the tribes.³³ Therefore, Lawrence clearly expressed the importance of the Hussein bin Ali revolution to Britain when he said: "I believed in the Arab movement... because it contained the idea of tearing the Turks (Ottomans) into pieces ..."³⁴.

Britain has sought to harness the efforts of the Arab princes to its advantage. The High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry Macmahon, stated in his telegram to the Foreign Ministry on March 21, 1916, that he said: "We must try to get such effective aid from all the different Arab elements as much as each of them can give"³⁵.

The British fleet had attacked the Ottoman centers on the Red Sea coast before and after the start of the Great Arab Revolt to prevent supplies and weapons from reaching the Ottoman forces and in support of the Sharif Hussein bin Ali revolution that was about to erupt³⁶. On June 3, 1916, a British ship approached the town of Umluj to see the Ottoman forces in the town, and British planes dropped leaflets calling on the people to join the revolution of Sharif Hussein bin Ali³⁷, the British authorities have used phrases that include promises to guarantee the independence of the Arabian Peninsula, confirm that some tribes have actually participated in the ongoing military battles, and at the same time confirm that the British respect the Islamic religion and that they allowed sending grain to the port of Jeddah, but the Ottoman authorities seized it, and all these allegations aimed to urge the tribes to join the revolution that targets the interests of the Arabs alone, the British showed in the same publications that

they had no interests in the region, and that they were forced to fight the aggressor Ottoman Empire by joining Germany³⁸.

With the British successfully supporting the Great Arab Revolt that erupted in June 1916, Britain will have achieved a great victory in occupying the Ottoman Empire with an internal war that cost it a lot of political and military efforts.

To tighten the noose around the Ottoman Empire and its loyalists, Britain decided to besiege Ibn Rashid economically by closing the Kuwaiti markets in his face. It also began monitoring his contacts with the Sheikh of Kuwait Jaber bin Mubarak Al-Sabah. Although the British authorities remained ignorant of Ibn Rashid's movements in Najd, they were sure that he would not advance towards Kuwait and southern Iraq for fear of an expected attack on the rear of his forces by Abdul Aziz Al Saud. However, Britain remained concerned about Ibn Rashid's moves³⁹. In an attempt to get rid of her anxiety and preoccupation with Ibn Rashid, the political officer Percy Cox sent him May 16, 1916, a letter asking him to remain neutral in this war between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. However, Ibn Rashid did not answer, and Cox explained this position of him as being afraid of exposing himself to danger if the Ottoman Empire learned of his contacts with the British authorities. He indicated that he understood from some of Ibn Rashid's followers his desire not to move against the British forces in southern Iraq, which made him describe this as a wise policy, and that he was convinced that Ibn Rashid would not interfere between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. However, Britain was not convinced by what some of Ibn Rashid's followers said because it wanted a definitive promise of his commitment to neutrality, not a convincing excuse. And when Britain despaired of obtaining what confirmed Ibn Rashid's neutrality, it threatened to restrict him economically by preventing his convoys from obtaining supplies from the supply centers in southern Iraq; she was not satisfied with this threat, as she gave him an ultimatum to move his forces near southern Iraq to a further area towards the north of the Arabian Peninsula, Cox also informed him that the Ottoman forces in Iraq are in a bad situation because they are trapped between the Russian forces in the East and the British in the south, which puts tremendous pressure on them⁴⁰. Cox wanted to frustrate Ibn Rashid and raise his doubts about the strength of the Ottoman Empire in the hope of changing his position⁴¹.

Cox also sent to Ibn Rashid an envoy called Abdullah Al-Faris, to negotiate with him about Britain's request from him to leave the borders of Iraq, return to his country, and not interfere in the course of the war between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, but the mission of the British delegation failed⁴². Cox sent a message to Prince Saud bin Rashid, in which he said: "We know now, from what you have said, that you agree with the Ottoman Empire, which helps you financially, and that you will participate with it in attacking us as soon as it

sends you troops, and the Turks will never send forces to you, not within a month or a year," but since you are considered as one of them, it is clear that you cannot remain so close to us as you are now in Safwan, and it has become necessary for you to go to a further place, and accordingly we ask that you go to Al-Rakhima⁴³, and not to come close to that, whether in the direction of Nasiriyah, al-Khamisiyah⁴⁴, or al-Zubayr. and so long as you have camped at Rakhima, and your men of war advance no further, and so long as you abstain from interfering with our patrols, our gunmen, and our friends, we agree to give entry permits to your convoys to a reasonable extent, provided you are sure that the goods you carry are yours and your tribes and no one else... and if at any time you act in the opposite way we shall then be obliged to refuse to give permission again. Still, it is very necessary to move your camp without delay, and we will not be able to permit it until it is first done, and for if you remain so close to us, a clash may arise between our horsemen and your men"⁴⁵.

After joining the allies, the Britain urged Sharif Hussein bin Ali to win over Ibn Rashid⁴⁶, in October 1916, the British commissioner in Jeddah asked him to lure Ibn Rashid with money, perhaps changing his position⁴⁷. Thus, The Britain used various means to influence Ibn Rashid to join the allies or remain neutral.

Concerning the Emir of Al-Jawf, Britain contacted him directly to arrange with him to expand the scope of the Syrian desert's revolution to Iraq's borders. Contact with him agreed with Sharif Hussein bin Ali and his sons, and Britain aimed to use Al-Jawf as a base for aircraft to threaten the railways. The British commissioner in Jeddah informed Prince Faisal bin Al-Hussein on November 19, 1916, that he was preparing a plane carrying a representative of the British government to communicate with Nuri Shaalan in the case of the latter's approval. In confirmation of the British policy to encourage the Emir of Al-Jawf to antagonize the Ottoman forces in the region, the British commander in Egypt at this period sent a message to Nuri Al-Shaalan through Prince Faisal bin Al-Hussein, in which he said: "We will soon advance to Syria, we want you to cooperate with the Sheriff and with us, and we are ready to help you with weapons, ammunication, and money. Think about it, and we answer"⁴⁸.

However, the Emir of Al-Jawf did not respond with the required speed and had reservations about his public accession to the allies, which put an end to the British project to establish a war base for the landing of planes in his region. Still, this position did not prevent it from exploiting his sympathy towards the revolution of Sharif Hussein bin Ali to serve its political and military interests in the region. And it dedicates its goal, which was explained by the British political officer Bercy Cox in October 1916, by saying: "that all Arab leaders work together and in cooperation with us in expelling the Turks (Ottomans) from the Arabian Peninsula"⁴⁹.

The British authorities benefited from the sympathy of Nuri al-Shaalan during the Great Arab Revolt, as the Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman forces became suffering from the raids of successive tribes. And the danger of German submarines on the British fleet disappeared after the fall of the Ottoman centers located on the northern coast of the Red Sea. Britain's goal began to be achieved, which was to expel the Ottomans from the Arabian Peninsula as soon as possible; the forces of the Great Arab Revolt represented the right-wing of the British forces at this time, and their progress positively affected the movements of the British army in Palestine⁵⁰.

Thus, Britain began working to encircle the Ottoman forces from all sides as the forces of the Great Arab Revolt attacked the railways, and Britain benefited from the movement of its officers through Wadi Sirhan to expand the scope of the revolution against the Ottoman Empire. To complete this cordon, I began to restrict the Emir of Hail to stop supporting the Ottoman forces to maintain the state of siege by the Ottoman forces and prevent them from moving outside the Arabian Peninsula.

Prince Faisal bin Al Hussein had sent a letter to the British commissioner in Jeddah on November 24, 1916, in which he indicated his need for weapons and the need of the Emir of Al-Jawf, then said: "... the greatest reason for my urgency to seize the face is to expedite what is required of the referenced (Nuri Al-Shaalan.) and for other Syrian Arabs in the mentioned marina, as it is not possible to take out what is necessary for them on the Levantine coasts now except in that place because the anchorages located in the north of the face are now in the hands of the Turks (Ottomans) and tribes. they cannot rise against the Turks (Ottomans) and take what It is necessary only after the Turks (Ottomans) leave the aforementioned anchorages, such as Dhaba and Al-Muwailih ..."⁵¹.

Thus, by occupying the northern Ottoman coastal centers, Britain contributed to prompting the Emir of Al-Jawf and the tribes of the region to direct their military efforts against the forces of the Ottoman Empire by facilitating the arrival of supplies to them, which would encourage them to join the army of Prince of Faisal bin Al-Hussein. Thus, the British government sought to open a northern front to attack the railway, which would achieve significant military results.

Britain had sent intelligence officer Lawrence to the Hejaz to work on implementing British policy on the battlefield⁵². His closeness to the events enabled him to send reports to the Arab office in Cairo, which made the military command sufficiently aware of what was happening in the Hijaz and the north of the Arabian Peninsula. As a result, Britain worked persistently to win over the region's leaders or to neutralize them because it was aware of the damage they could inflict on it. Moreover, Hail was a privileged location through which its

emir could supply the Ottoman forces in the city⁵³. Wadi Al-Sarhan of the Emirate of Al-Jawf also represents strategic importance for the British moves and military plans in the region⁵⁴. In addition, the geographical location of the forces of the Great Arab Revolt enables them to help cut the land connection between the Ottoman Empire and its forces in Yemen⁵⁵, it helps prevent the use of the Red Sea coast as bases for German submarines⁵⁶.

Britain sought to achieve its political and military objectives in the north of the Arabian Peninsula by benefiting from the region's population. The British policy was not based on getting involved militarily in it because it had no desire to directly control it except through local leaders, where it worked to be a sponsor of its interests there, especially since the north of the Arabian Peninsula is adjacent to the areas that fell under direct British occupation, such as Iraq. Concerning the Hejaz, the British authorities did not send military forces even though they were able to do so because they realized that the presence of foreign forces in the Hejaz would negatively affect the position of the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire; Because the tribes of the region sympathetic to the revolution would not like the presence of non-Muslim foreign forces in the Hijaz to fight the Muslim Ottomans, which might divert the support of those tribes to the Ottomans instead of supporting the revolution. That is why the British authorities were satisfied with sending weapons and money⁵⁷.

The forces of the Great Arab Revolt were made up of tribesmen⁵⁸ Therefore, Britain sought to increase them and demanded that Sharif Hussein bin Ali contact the tribal sheikhs to increase these men⁵⁹. This is because "their war value is in conquest and surprises, not in regular lines. The Arabs' war is a geographical war, and we must look for the weak links in the chain linking the city to Damascus and shed most of our efforts on them, and our greatest means are the Bedouins"⁶⁰.

When the forces of the Great Arab Revolt began attacking the Ottoman forces in Hejaz, the British military command in Cairo wanted to find a base for an Arab attack in the north of Hejaz, so it chose Al-Wajh because of its proximity to the railway⁶¹, thus it became a base used against the railway⁶². The plan was for Prince Faisal bin Al Hussein, his army, and the British officer Lawrence to move by marching from Umluj, and at the same time the British fleet was advancing, December 24, 1917, was set as a specific date for the two parties to attack the Ottoman forces simultaneously from land and sea⁶³. Lawrence had stated that he sought to partner with Prince Faisal's army with a number of tribe members so that this attack would appear to the Arabs that it was carried out with the consent of the tribes, which would give propaganda and impetus to the great Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire⁶⁴.

Conclusion

The Ottoman state had a clear political and military presence in the north of the Arabian Peninsula. It took care of this region and was keen on its security and stability, as it was located on the Shami, Egyptian, and Iraqi pilgrimage route, leading to the holy Hijaz region.

One of the manifestations of the Ottoman Empire's interest in the northern Arabian Peninsula was the establishment of many fortresses to protect the pilgrims' routes, spread security, and maintain order.

Many local powers emerged in the north of the Arabian Peninsula, the most important of which are: the Emirate of Hail and the Emirate of Al-Jawf, which was administratively affiliated with the governor of Damascus during the Ottoman era. In contrast, the rest of the parts were affiliated with Medina.

The Ottoman influence in the north of the Arabian Peninsula increased after the establishment of the Hejaz Railway, which created a new situation for the region that it was not accustomed to previously. The Ottoman Empire was aware of the importance of the Arab Emirates in the north of the Arabian Peninsula (the Emirate of Hail and the Emirate of Al-Jawf), as it was seeking to impose its control in the region by relying on them, so it provided them with financial and moral support.

When the British ambitions for the properties of the Ottoman Empire began to appear clearly, the Ottoman Empire sought to prevent any British interference with the local powers in the north of the Arabian Peninsula. When the Ottoman Empire entered World War I, it began preparing for that, as it supported its forces in the north of the Arabian Peninsula and urged the local forces to support them. Still, the positions of the princes of the local forces in that region varied from the Ottoman Empire, Ibn Rashid in Hail declared his support for the Ottoman Empire, while Nuri al-Shaalan in al-Jawf showed sympathy for the Great Arab Revolt.

Concerning Britain, when it found that the Ottoman Empire had joined the Central Powers against the Allies, it intensified its contacts with the local forces in the northern region of the Arabian Peninsula, declaring its support for the Great Arab Revolt led by Sharif Hussein bin Ali. It also sent its men to communicate with the princes of the local powers in the north of the Arabian Peninsula to urge them to leave the Ottoman Empire.

Supporting the Arabs in the north of the Arabian Peninsula had an active role in Britain's winning the war. In addition, the Arab forces occupied the Ottoman forces along the Hejaz Railway. For his part, Ibn Rashid in Hail did not have a positive role in standing by the Ottoman Empire, as he burdened the Ottoman State with his many materials and military demands.

الموقف البريطاني من الإمارات العربية في شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية خلال الحرب العالمية الأولى 1914-1918

غازي فنانط العطنة، قسم التاريخ، جامعة اليرموك، إربد، الأردن.

ملخص

تتناول هذه الدراسة موضوعاً تاريخياً مهماً تمثل في الموقف البريطاني من الإمارات العربية في شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية خلال الحرب العالمية الأولى، في إشارة إلى الصراع البريطاني مع الدولة العثمانية، وسعي بريطانيا لإنهاء الوجود العثماني في الجزيرة العربية، إذ قامت بريطانيا من أجل تحقيق هذا الهدف بمقاومة الوجود العثماني في المنطقة، ومقاومة نفوذ القوى المحلية في شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية، وقد جهدت بريطانيا في سبيل تحقيق غاياتها في اتباع أساليب شتى من الترغيب والترهيب.

وتناولت الدراسة أيضاً مساندة أهالي شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية للثورة العربية الكبرى، التي سعت إلى تحرير العرب ورفع شأنهم، تلك الثورة التي كادت تحقق أهدافها لولا نقض بريطانيا لعودها للعرب.

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى فهم ماهية الموقف البريطاني من الإمارات العربية في شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية أثناء الحرب العالمية الأولى، ونتائج هذا الموقف على مستوى منطقة شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية بشكل خاص والجزيرة العربية بشكل عام، وإلى بيان المخطط البريطاني الهادف إلى السيطرة على الشرق العربي برمته، وتهدف الدراسة أيضاً إلى معرفة الظروف والأحوال التي أحاطت بمنطقة شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية أثناء الحرب العالمية الأولى، ومعرفة ردة فعل القوى المحلية تجاه التدخل البريطاني.

تكمن أهمية الدراسة في أنها تتناول السياسة البريطانية تجاه القوى المحلية في شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية أثناء الحرب العالمية الأولى، وموقف هذه القوى منها، نظراً لقلّة الكتابات عن منطقة شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية، إذ ركزت معظم الكتابات على منطقة نجد ومكة في حديثها عن الجزيرة العربية ولم تعطِ منطقة شمال شبه الجزيرة العربية الاهتمام الكافي.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الدولة العثمانية، بريطانيا الاستعمارية، إمارة حائل.

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