

## The Camp David Accords: Lessons and Facts

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### Abstract

The purposes of this study is to explore the development of events since Sadat assumed the presidency in 1970, abandoned Nassir's policies and established a close alliance with the United States, and eventually signing the Camp David Accords. This study focuses primarily on this historic peace treaty and its economic, cultural, and political impacts specifically on both Egypt and Israel in specific and the Middle East in general.

The study demonstrates that the Camp David Accords were a watershed in the Middle East affairs, however, this achievement will remain problematic until a broader Middle East peace will be achieved.

### Introduction

The Camp David Accords; represent a watershed in the modern history of the Middle East. Sadat was seen by many as a hero. He did what no other president before him had done; he was willing to work with Israel to foster a peace agreement. The Camp David Accords were the result of all of his efforts. Looking back at the treaty years later, we are able to examine were the immediate responses, the long term consequences, and lessons that we can learn for future peace agreements in the Middle East. The Camp David Accords could be a model for future peace agreements between Israel and Arabs on the following grounds: First, American auspices could produce an agreement based on the principle of "land for peace". The Accords proved that negotiations without the United States have had little chances of success. Second, Camp David would eventually reduce Israeli fears and security concerns. Third, Arabs realized that there could be no war with Israel without Egypt, so they had no choice but to negotiate with Israel. Thus, Camp David could be seen as something of a model for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations; in other words, Camp David could have provided a model that can be easily copied in future negotiations could have enduring influence on any future agreements.<sup>(1)</sup>

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Despite the existence of the treaty, Egypt and Israel still live in an era of cold peace and Egypt is economically dependent on the US for its survival. In this paper, we will discuss what went right and what went wrong, focusing mainly on the long term effects of Camp David. We will also provide various accounts regarding the immediate reactions from different parties to the Accords. This paper does not claim to have the solution to the problems of normalization and hostility in the region. However, by looking at the Camp David Accords as a blueprint and examining it closely, it is possible to learn from our mistakes and to continue our successes.

### **Nassir and the Arab-Israeli Conflict**

Abd al-Nassir was seen as a hero of Egypt and his way of politics served as an example many other Arab nations followed. However, his time in office was marked by his inability to effectively deal with Israel, which would later pave the way for the Camp David Accords. "It was inevitable that the dynamics of Nassirist policy should impel Abd al-Nassir into the position of leading champion of the Arabs in what for most of them was the central problem: that of their relations with Israel."<sup>(2)</sup> Nassir's original policy was to be cautious in attempting to assert Egypt's power as a leader of the Arab states in the Middle East, but by 1955, he began to assert more power as he became seen as "the symbolic figure of Arab nationalism."<sup>(3)</sup> Nassir wanted to exert his strength as a leader of the Arab nations, which he had hoped would become so solidified together that Western nations would have to pay more attention to them and their relations.

One of Nassir's main goals was to have the Palestinian cause recognized and to grant them their own state. The problem with having this as such a large goal is that it is a very controversial issue. Obviously many Western nations at this point were still horrified by the treatment of Jews in the World War II that it was hard to go against them, especially not with the United States as their main protector. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) became a separate entity from the Arab League in 1964; however, it was still under Egypt, and therefore Nassir's control. However, many in this group were tired of diplomacy and by 1965; they "were beginning to take direct action inside Israel."<sup>(4)</sup> With a strong influx of reparations from West Germany, and knowing the large threats against them by their neighbors, Israel has already begun building up their armed forces in the event of an attack.

Nassir, however, was still confident in his ability to win over the Israelis in any form of confrontation. There were rumored reports that the Israelis were planning attacks on neighbors including Syria and Jordan, and Nassir despite knowing the buildup of Israeli forces decided he had to defend the Arab League.

He was confident in his ability to win because he assumed that either the United States should intervene with a political settlement or “his armed forces, equipped and trained by the USSR, were strong enough to win.”<sup>(5)</sup> In June 5<sup>th</sup> 1967, Israel attacked Egypt and destroyed its airbases. It was a combination of good strategy and poor timing that Egypt was unable to defend its air forces. During those few days, “Israelis occupied Sinai as far as the Suez Canal, the West Bank Jerusalem, and part of southern Syria, the Golan Heights” before the United Nations issued a cease-fire<sup>(6)</sup>. This had huge after effects on the Arab people. Israel now occupied both Muslim and Christian holy lands, which added much more tensions to the relations between Israel and the rest of the Arab peoples. It also proved both Nassir and the Arab people were not as strong militarily as they thought they were. The “swift Israeli victory also made Israel more desirable as an ally in American eyes.”<sup>(7)</sup> It also meant the USSR suffered a kind of defeat, as their allies were so swiftly defeated by the West. As a result of Israel’s conquering of the West Bank, there were many more Palestinian refugees who increased tensions between Israel and the PLO even further. After the defeat, Nassir announced his resignation, but the outburst of support for him was still overwhelming.

### **Sadat and The Divorce with Nassir's Nationalist Policies**

Following Nassir’s sudden death in 1970, Anwar Sadat, his vice president took power. Most people assumed Egypt would continue as before politically, but he was more different than Nassir, he was not the political puppet many thought he was. Sadat reinstated a multiparty system, and launched the Infitah (opening) economic policy. He also sought to break many of Egypt’s ties with the USSR. “Early in the 1970s [he] made a certain change in policy when he asked for the withdrawal of Russian advisors and technicians.”<sup>(8)</sup> He wanted to end the Soviet influence and completely separate himself from the stink of failure from the six-day war and Nassir’s shadow.

In October of 1973, Sadat made a bold move and attacked Israel with the hopes of regaining the Sinai Peninsula lost in 1967. However, once again, Egypt suffered a cruel defeat, and Israel remained in control of the land. Many believed Sadat did not actually attack Israel to get the land back; it was more of a power play to get the Western nations focused on the problems in the Middle East instead of the iron curtain and USSR. What he really wanted was for the West to “take the lead in negotiating some settlements of the problems between Israel and the Arabs which would prevent a further crisis and dangerous confrontation”.<sup>(9)</sup> The West did intervene to some extent. Over the next two years, the United States mediated an Israeli-Syrian agreement, which called for Israel to withdraw from some of the territory they had conquered in the Golan

Heights. However, after one failed attempt to mediate between all the Arab nations and Israel, the United States continued in their open support for Israel.

### **The Path to the Camp David Accords**

Sadat had been trying to negotiate some issues with Israel on his own for five years. He attempted to strike peace relations with Israel, but was worried about many of the peace talks not progressing, partially because of disagreements with his Arab and communist allies. He sought to protect Egypt's place in inter-Arab politics by covering himself with a language that suggested he was not making separate peace talks with Israel. In November of 1977, he openly traveled to Israel for peace negotiations that would later fall through. This was a very bad strategic view in terms of his relations with allies. Egypt was seen as a traitor by the Arab world. By visiting Israel, he implicitly recognized it as a state. In addition, many countries including Yugoslavia, East Germany and Hungary threatened to end their support to Egypt if it signed peace negotiations with Israel. But Sadat's main goal was to improve his own people first he needed to focus more on Egypt's issues than on the Arab ones, and his main priority was to restore the Sinai Peninsula and improve the ailing Egyptian economy, as well as "to eliminate the Soviet Union as a factor in the Middle East."<sup>(10)</sup>

When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, he brought a fresh perspective to the various negotiations. He initially wanted to find a way to include Palestinians in the negotiations. However, these efforts failed once a stronger nationalist government took power in Israel with Menahem Begin becoming prime minister, and Sadat's visit to Israel.<sup>(11)</sup> Israel and Egypt both did want to strike peace negotiations with each other. Israel wanted to make peace with Egypt, because individually Egypt was their most formidable opponent. Israel was even willing to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula if it meant peace because then they would be able to fight the PLO and Syria more effectively. Egypt wanted to end the fighting mostly because it meant a potential new ally in the strong United States and a potentially more favorable view of them in the Western international perspective.

Jimmy Carter was able to facilitate these discussions and peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel. The Camp David Accords took place September 5th-17th, 1978. The negotiations were a tough process Begin and Sadat had such strong mutual antipathy that Carter had to mediate heavily and have many one on one discussions with each side, but he was relentless about not allowing either party to leave without a conclusion. Both Carter and Sadat were in a unique position; it would have had negative effects on both of them if these

negotiations were not completed. For Sadat, it meant another form of defeat by Israel, and for Carter it would have been almost a shame on the United States if their head of state failed as a diplomat.<sup>(12)</sup> As a result, Israel had the strongest bargaining tool since they had little to lose as already being hated in the Arab world. At the end of the Camp David negotiations, the Camp David Accords were signed on September 17, 1978, and two different agreements were signed. The First Agreement was “A framework of peace in the Middle East” which was intended to later potentially deal with the Palestinian question. However, the language used to describe it was so ambiguous that it left both sides to interpret it differently which left the Palestinian question unanswered, while also making Israel less open to any future discussions of Palestine. Thus, the Camp David Accords failed to set the framework for just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.<sup>(13)</sup> The second agreement was “a framework for peace between Israel and Egypt.” This second agreement had more results as it “restored Egyptian sovereignty over its territory (except for the partial demilitarization of Sinai).<sup>(14)</sup> This gave the Egyptians back their land, and meant mutual recognition of each country by the other. Also part of this agreement was the United States committing several billion dollars worth of annual subsidies to both governments.

### **Middle East Politics after the Accords**

Because of this agreement, many Arabs felt betrayed by Egypt, thinking that Sadat was putting Egypt first before their Arab League Partners. Following the Camp David conference in 1978, a summit meeting was held in Iraq, and all Arab leaders agreed to impose economic and political sanctions on Egypt. Arab leaders called for Egypt to withdraw from the Camp David agreement and threatened Egypt with Sanctions were a peace treaty signed, when such a treaty was signed, ministers of all Arab countries gathered at a second summit meeting in Baghdad and agree to take the following actions:

1. To discontinue loans, deposits, guarantees, bank credit facilities, and financial and technical aid from Arab governments and their organizations to the Egyptian government and its organizations.
2. To ban any economic aid to Egypt from Arab funds, bank, and financial institutions within the sphere of the Arab League and of other joint Arab organizations.
3. To stop Arab government and organizations from acquiring bonds, shares, debentures, and debt issue offered by the Egyptian government and/or its financial organizations.

4. To suspend Egypt from the Arab League and from organizations and funds affiliated with it.
5. To halt the sale of oil and oil products to Egypt.
6. To prohibit commercial exchanges with organizations (public or private) that cooperate with Israel, in accordance with the terms of the Arab economic boycott.<sup>(15)</sup>

As a result, the headquarters of the Arab League was moved from Cairo to Tunis and many closed their embassies and broke off trade and diplomatic relations with Egypt.<sup>(16)</sup> This isolation of Egypt would continue for at least another decade. In addition to this, the peace Egypt experienced with Israel was not actual peace. It was a formal, cold, official peace. Many would argue that peace should be a work of the people not a work of the government alone. Just because there were open embassies, borders, exchange, and tourism, does not mean there was no animosity between the people.

In the immediate aftermath of the Camp David Accords, one would suspect that the reactions would have been positive. However, this is not the case. While there were certainly many that had high hopes for the Camp David Accords, there were also those that looked back on them with disappointment. In Israel, for example, there were mixed opinions depending on who was evaluating the events. At the simplest level, Shimon Peres, the leader of the Opposition Labor Party, described his version of what transpired at Camp David:

At Camp David, not only were agreements – framework agreements – signed, but the seeds of a new reality were sown. The agreements will grow old with time and a new vista will appear, thanks to the seeds sown. Two plants at least have been planted: peace between us and Egypt and the plant of Palestinian existence between us and Jordan. It appears that these seeds, and certainly their growth, are not tied to any time period.<sup>(17)</sup>

By Peres, at least, the Camp David Accords were seen as a stepping stone that would grow into better and stronger relationships both with Egypt as well as with the rest of the Arab world. Later in his article, Peres argues that Israel has a vested interest in ensuring that the Camp David Accords succeed since if other countries were to follow Egypt's path and make similar agreements, Israel would be protected from the "radical" Arab states that did not recognize Israel. Ultimately, though, the goal was an independent Jewish establishment, and Peres defended the position that Camp David would make that possible:

We must view the Camp David agreements as one views a pair of scales, where one side contains rights and the other obligations but which are nevertheless balanced positively. One must also see them as constituting a new

reality, capable of growth, but also containing forces which threaten that growth. As we support the commencement of the new era, we shall also help to turn it into a blessing for the whole region and the embodiment of a great Jewish dream.<sup>(18)</sup>

The Accords set a new standard for what it meant to have peace within the country. Uri Avneri wrote that other countries would have to deal with the fact that Egypt had established a peace treaty with Israel, and given this, “a period of time will pass before the Israeli citizens digest the full meaning of this major transformation. But its implications are clear already, and anyone who has eyes can see them.”<sup>(19)</sup> The settlers in Israel had a quite different perspective, however. Instead of being happy for the treaty, many of them were scared that it would mean the return of the Palestinians to their land. Because the land in the West Bank was the most fertile land, the settlers did not want to lose it. Afraid of the refugees, or “absentees,” taking back their land, Haim Denkner wrote an article in *Haaretz*, an Israeli newspaper:

Now, there will be autonomy. Even if it should be agreed not to let any more Arabs into the West Bank – and it doesn’t seem likely but let’s say it will happen and these “absentees” will be able to return by “mistake,” and they will all be here. Then they’ll all parade to the courts, ours or theirs, it makes no difference, show their kushans [deeds] and then – that’s it. The settlements will have no land left<sup>(20)</sup>.

If the Palestinians were allowed to relocate back to Palestine, they would legally request their land, and the settlers who had taken it in the first place would not be able to use it for their own needs anymore. Thus, even though the government and people in Israel were happy about the future of normalized relations, they were also afraid of what the future might hold for Israel/Palestinian relations.

In Egypt, the reactions were also mostly positive, as there were many people waiting for Sadat at the airport the day that he returned from Israel. Yet, the more informative story is those people that did not approve of the Accords. For many, the lack of focus on the Palestinian question during the Camp David Accords doomed it to failure. As one scholar wrote:

While the Camp David document on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is reasonably specific and clear, the document relating to the West Bank and Gaza is deliberately equivocal. Both Begin and Sadat portray it as consistent with their previous positions. One of them has clearly got it wrong. Our conviction is that the future of these territories and populations will be

determined less by the fine print of the document than by the realities that lie beyond and behind the text<sup>(21)</sup>.

The inability to finalize the situation between Israel and Palestine would mean future failures that would display badly on the Camp David Accords. Neither party, Sadat nor Begin, was willing to make the compromises necessary to reach a true peace agreement. The discussion of the Arab-Israeli issue was too important to be forgotten, and it created havoc, not only for the Egyptians, but also for the Palestinians. The international community also speculated that this would lead to a radicalization of the Arab world, as it would isolate the rest of the countries with which Israel had *not* fostered a peace agreement:

It was difficult not to salute the first real gleam of peace on the Middle Eastern horizon, but there was a curiously disconcerted reaction to the new trend. In many Foreign Ministries the response could be summed up in the phrase, "Yes, but..." Was an agreement useful if it was "only" with Egypt? Might this not radicalize the rest of the Arab world? Sadat was inaugurating a process that deliberately excluded the Soviet Union and the PLO. Was this wise? Even if he obtained a treaty with Israel and an agreed statement of principles about the future of the Palestine Arabs, would not this still be far from the "comprehensive" agreement that the United States and other Western governments had enunciated as the highest, and, indeed, the only good? Reservation followed objection in a cascade of troubled skepticism. And all the doubts were summarily expressed in a curious nostalgia for Geneva<sup>(22)</sup>.

As it can be seen clearly by the aforementioned text, many people around the world, including the Egyptians, were very upset by the Accords, not just because it had alienated the rest of the Middle Eastern countries, but because it had fallen short of expectations by those watching and waiting for a change. In October 1981, Sadat was assassinated by Islamic fundamentalists. The Camp David agreement was among the many charges the Islamic fundamentalists used to justify the incident. Jimmy Carter was one of the main architects of the Camp David Accords received much credit, and domestic and international praise for his achievement in promoting peace between Egypt and Israel. Carter gave much of his time and energy to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, such achievement was not adequate to ensure his reelection in 1980.<sup>(23)</sup>

The U.S. refused to follow through on the provisions of the agreement calling for Palestinian autonomy, continuing full support to Israel even as Jewish colonization and anti-Palestinian repression in the West Bank greatly increased. The overall result of such unconditional and unlimited support to Israel is tragic for both Palestinians and Israelis. The American support to Israel hinders the peace process. Israeli's interest ultimately lies not in the amount of political,



economic, or military aid it receives from the United States, but in Israel's willingness to recognize Palestinian statehood, and withdraw from occupied territories, in short to make peace with its neighbors.

### **The Economic, Cultural, and Political Impacts of the Accords**

Foreign assistance is an economic instrument, for the United States, it is a political tool, the giving of aid- deciding who gets what, when, and how much, using aid to leverage recipient government for other purposes is inherently a policy and thus a political instrument, as it will be detailed in the following pages.

In addition to the aforementioned immediate outcomes of the 1978 Camp David Accords there have since been a number of long term outcomes that have impacted Egypt, Israel and the rest of the Middle Eastern region. In general, there have been three major areas in which these effects have occurred. First, there have been economic impacts, second there have been ramifications in the area of normalization, and finally, there has been an effect on Egypt's regional role, that is, the position it occupies in the balance of power in the Middle East. The following analysis will focus on each of these three major outcomes in depth.

The first major long term outcome of the Camp David Accords was the economic impact it had on the countries involved, Egypt and Israel. The economic effects of the Accords can be further broken down into the effects of the foreign aid distributed by the United States as a condition of the Accords, the impact on the tourism industry of the two countries and the result of trade between the two countries. In regards to the area of foreign aid, the Camp David Accords made Israel the number one recipient of U.S. aid in the world and Egypt the second largest. To put these numbers in perspective Egypt and Israel received half of all foreign aid distributed by the United States annually in the 1970's and 1980's<sup>(24)</sup>. Over the years Egypt has received billions of dollars in military aid and economic assistance<sup>(25)</sup>. Amounts of U.S. economic assistance to Egypt from 1974 to 1984 are listed in Tables 1 and 2.

At the same time Israel receives billions of dollars in military aid and economic assistance<sup>(26)</sup>. U.S. foreign Aid to Egypt and Israel in the last ten years is illustrated in Table 3.

**Table (1):** U.S. Economic Assistance to Egypt by Major Sectors, Fiscal Years 1974-1984\*

<b>Assistance sector</b>	<b>Obligated (millions)</b>
<b>Project assistance</b>	
Infrastructure	\$2,189.2
Public industry	431.0
Agriculture and irrigation	291.1
Social services	414.5
Decentralization	432.2
Finance and investment projects	130.6
Science and technology	78.9
Other projects (Feasibility studies and small projects)	109.9
<b>Non-project assistance</b>	
CIP	\$3,119.8
Cash transfers	101.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$7,301.1</b>

\* Source: U.S. General Accounting office, *The U.S. Economic Assistance program for Egypt poses a management challenge for AID*, Report to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, July 31, 1985. p. 4.

**Table (2):** U.S. Economic Assistance to Egypt, Fiscal Years 1974 to 1984\*

	<b>FY 1974 Thru Fy 1984</b>	
	<b>Obligated (\$ 000)</b>	<b>Expended (\$00)</b>
Economic Support Fund (ESF)		
Commodity Import Program (CIP)	2,823,852	2,211,3411
Projects	3,629,659	1,771,524
Total ESF	6,453,511	3,982,865
P.L. 480		
Title I	1,847,966	1,812,973
Title II	143,362	136,606
Title III	73,511	58,511
Total P.L. 480	2,064,839	2,008,090
<b>Total Dollar Funded Programs</b>	<b>8,518,350</b>	<b>5,990,995</b>


\* Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Ten years of progress: USAID in Egypt (Cairo, Arab World Printing House, 1984), p. 11.

**Table (3): U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt and Israel / Fiscal Years 2001-2010.**

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Israel											Notes One-third of ALL US AID goes to Israel and Egypt.  These 2 countries receive one-third of the total aid, the majority of which pays for armaments. Yet, neither is a "developing" country.
Economic Aid (ESF)	838	1,080	600	477	1,537	240	120	389	781	400	
Military Aid (FMF)	1,975	2,040	2,100	2,147	1,448	2,280	2,340	2,381	2,550	2,775	
Israel Total	2,813	3,120	2,700	2,624	2,985	2,520	2,460	2,770	2,331	3,175	
Egypt											
Economic Aid (ESF)	693	775	615	571	530	495	455	412	200	250	
Military Aid (FMF)	1,297	1,300	1,300	1,292	1,289	1,300	1,300	1,289	1,300	1,300	
Egypt Total	1,990	2,075	1,915	1,863	1,819	1,795	1,758	1,701	1,500	1,550	

\*Source: U.S. Foreign Aid Summary, <http://www.vaughns-1-pagers.com/politics/us-foreign-aid.htm>

### U.S. Aid to Egypt, 1946-2009



**Figure 1**

Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Greenbook. Data is reported in 2009 constant USD.

The idea behind the foreign aid is that it should demonstrate to the world the benefits of peace. Hanna Ebeid, a Development Studies specialist from the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, explains the rationale behind the U.S. aid to Egypt as such:

A set of subsequent corollaries defined the US strategic objectives of economic assistance to Egypt: to foster economic and social development within Egypt and thereby to create the preconditions for a permanent peace; to foster a process of reconciliation and peace in the region through demonstration effect; and to contain Islamic fundamentalist and radical ideologies and promote moderation<sup>(27)</sup>.

In other words, the aim of aid coming from the Accords was to develop Egypt economically to the point where it would recognize the benefits of peace and to use it as an example to the rest of the Arab world so that other countries would follow in its footsteps. While the aid has been beneficial to Egypt, particularly in the modernization of its military, it has not come without criticism.

First there is the issue of the visibility of the aid coming into Egypt as a result of the Camp David Accords. This can be summarized by the fact that a

majority of average life Egyptians that comprise the general populace do not see the impacts of the aid being received by the Egyptian government. Or, if they do see money being spent by the government they do not know that it is money coming from the Camp David Accords. If they were able to recognize that the money was from Camp David it might create a more favorable impression of the Accords. The problem is that currently 40% of U.S. foreign aid to Egypt is controlled and distributed by the USAID, which the agency responsible for utilizing the resources. They prefer to be law key when undertaking projects and do not publicize that the project is funded by the Camp David money; this is the main contributing factor to the visibility problem of the aid. The second problem with the foreign aid going to Egypt from the Camp David Accords is that many Egyptians feel that there is a discrepancy between the aid going to Egypt and the aid destined for Israel. The Egyptian media fuels this feeling in particular. The idea being that while Israel receives aid with “no strings attached”, meaning it can be spent as they please, the aid for Egypt is project-bound. This means that Egyptians must spend the aid on projects that have U.S. support and approval, leading many in Egypt to believe that the aid in the end supports American interests over Egyptian ones<sup>(28)</sup>. This adds to the unfavorable impression of Camp David in Egypt. The third and final problem that experts point to is that American aid creates a dependency problem, and Egypt is a victim of this. Leon Hadar, a research fellow at the CATO Institute, explains:

One can compare the high-level U.S. involvement in the Middle East to an addicting drug. Various regional players have become dependent on American aid. Each military crisis and peace process leads to more and more American diplomatic and military commitments to old and new clients in the region, which in turn produces incentives for them to ask for even more economic and military support<sup>(29)</sup>.

Proponents of dependency theory insist that in the context of the world capitalist system, this dependence, as with other less developed countries, means subordination to the more developed, wealthier countries. Because of uneven, exploitative policies, developing countries are kept from adjusting their domestic production and export trading patterns to their own national advantage. In the now familiar arguments, the richer countries are seen as able to force the dependent ones to adopt policies that work essentially to the advantage of the core countries in world system<sup>(30)</sup>.

Egypt's dependency on the U.S. is best described as follows:

"The U.S. and its assistance program are a part of Egypt's problem and part of its solution. The country has come to rely on the U.S. assistance and is now too dependent on it. Some Egyptians resent what has happened. Twenty years ago, Egypt

fed itself today it imports close to half its food. Economic aid has enabled Egypt to avoid harsh economic choices and delay developing a clear strategy for economic reform, thus amplifying distortions in the economy and creating production disincentives. Since 1979, Egypt has also received large amounts of military hardware from the U.S., imposing a different burden. Many of those military loans were contracted at high interest rates, some at close to 14 percent, with penalties for late payments. All this means debt payments to the U.S. in 1986 of more than \$900 million, which just about cancels the \$1 billion in economic assistance provided by Egypt in 1986"<sup>(31)</sup>.

The end result of the dependency problem is that Egypt would have to become subservient to American interests because the aid it receives is vital to its survival, it has been noted that Egypt may have an American food dependency.

In addition to the effect of foreign aid from Camp David, the Accords had other significant economic impacts. There was a major impact on the tourism industry of Egypt as a result of the Accords. After the Accords were signed, the Egyptian-Israeli borders were opened for tourists from both sides; however, increases in tourism were completely one sided and favored Egypt much more than they did Israel. The reason being that the Egyptian government often discouraged its citizens to travel to Israel. The discrepancy is most apparent when you look at the peak numbers of tourists from one country to the other since Camp David. The most Israelis to visit Egypt in a single year was 415,000 which came in 1999 compared this to the most Egyptians to visit Israel in a single year 28,000, which was in 1995<sup>(32)</sup>. In sum, the influx of Israeli tourists was one of the more beneficial aspects of the Camp David Accords for Egypt and became a great economic asset.

The final segment of the economic outcome of the Camp David Accords is related to trade. While in the immediate aftermath of the Accords, there was not much economic activity between Egypt and Israel this has changed drastically in recent years. The large amount of trade now between the two countries can be seen as a direct outcome of the groundwork laid by the Accords. At first, following the accords it was imagined that there would be high levels of bilateral trade between Egypt and Israel; expectations were high after they struck an oil deal soon after the signing of the Accords. The trade relationship, however, deteriorated rapidly. According to Paul Rivlin, Senior Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, the main reason for the poor trade relationship was that the Egyptian government was often unwilling to participate. This lack of a trade relationship continued for some time, but in 2004

the United States initiated a program with Egypt and Israel to revitalize their trade relationship<sup>(33)</sup>. Rivlin describes the agreement as such:

At the end of 2004, the Egyptian, Israeli, and US governments signed an agreement to create eight “Qualified Industrial Zones” (QIZs) in Egypt that came into force in February 2005. The agreement permits goods made in Egypt with a specified minimum Israeli content to enter the US duty free. As there is no free trade agreement between Egypt and the US, Egyptian exports to the US are subject to duties and other restrictions. The QIZ agreement has made it possible to expand industrial exports and create thousands of jobs — vital to the Egyptian economy<sup>(34)</sup>.

The new Qualified Industrial Zones have greatly contributed to the renewed trade between Egypt and Israel. For example from 2000-2004, prior to the QIZ agreement Egyptian exports to Israel were only \$22 million dollars. In the years following the agreement, 2005-2008 they were on average \$90 million dollars annually<sup>(35)</sup>. In addition to this, the latest numbers from 2008 are the highest since the Camp David Accords with Israel importing \$132 million dollars of goods from Egypt and Egypt importing \$139 million dollars worth of goods from Israel<sup>(36)</sup>. This growing bilateral trade relationship is beneficial to both countries economically and also for their relationship in general. A growing dependence on trade with one another should help in the area of normalization and create a more permanent peace.

The U.S foreign aid to Egypt has failed to have a significant impact on promoting development in Egypt’s economy. Critics of this foreign aid have many weapons at their disposal. There is a plethora of reports of waste, mismanagement, corruption, and inappropriate projects and/or technologies. High level of corruption within Egypt led many Americans to question whether the United States should continue to give aid to such a regime. However, the failure of this American aid to Egypt is a very complex issue in which there are many culprits, as there are numerous problems emanating from the American side as well, in the case of Egypt, it is obvious that the political and strategic objectives take precedence over economic development, thus rendering much of the foreign aid packages to Egypt developmentally irrelevant (at best) or damaging (at worst)<sup>(37)</sup>.

Since 1979, Egypt has received billions of US\$ in economic assistance from the United States. The purpose of this aid has remained eventually the same over the years: it has been both an incentive and a reward for Egypt’s commitment to peace with Israel, and for other reasons: Egypt has become a strategic asset to

the U.S. interests in the Middle East (oil, trade, regional security, counter terrorism and so on)<sup>(38)</sup>.

Still, Egypt has not demonstrated the ability to use this huge economic assistance to promote its own economic development to a significant degree. Nor has the United States been able or willing to use these funds more effectively<sup>(39)</sup>.

Nassir and the Free Officers came to power in 1952 with no economic blueprint on how to effectively promote growth and development<sup>(40)</sup>. Things seem not to have changed much since 1952; Egypt remains yet another example in which authoritarian elite has failed to push its economy anywhere near self-sustaining growth.

To sum up, the U.S. aid program in Egypt is a failure; Egypt could not use the American foreign assistance effectively. The country remains poor, overpopulated, polluted and undemocratic. In short, Egypt in 2012 continues to exhibit virtually all the characteristics the United states has claimed to want to change since it began its massive economic aid program in 1979. This failure to better utilize billions of dollars in foreign assistance can be blamed on Egyptians and Americans alike.

As far as the impact of the U.S aid to Israel, the roots of U.S. aid to Israel had started long time before signing the camp David Accords, it's dated to early 1950s. However, the U.S aid to Israel has been high after 1967 war when Israel demonstrated its military superiority in the region. Aid increased soon again after 1979.

U.S. aid to Israel has been justified as a reward to support the peace between Israel and Egypt, and to support the peace process in general. However, in order to encourage Israel to engage in a real peace process with its Arab neighbors, the U.S must apply the carrot and stick principle to convince Israel to make the necessary compromises to attain peace. Yet, the United States has used the carrot with Israel exclusively. With repeated public pronouncements by U.S. officials that aid to Israel is unconditional, Israel lost the incentive to make the necessary concessions that could lead to peace or even to end its human rights abuses and violation of international law<sup>(41)</sup>. As former secretary of state Henry Kissinger once said,

"I ask Rabin to make concessions, and he says he cannot because Israel is weak. So I give him more arms, and then he says he does not need to make concessions because Israel is strong"<sup>(42)</sup>.



The second major outcome of the Camp David Accords has been the way the agreement has affected normalization between Egypt and Israel, normalization as the cornerstone of peace, peace with normal interpersonal relationships, including cultural exchange is more powerful and more lasting than any security arrangements. A peace treaty is signed between governments and not necessarily between the people of the country so therefore a peace treaty does not automatically lead to normalization. This is a good example of the case with Egypt and Israel, while the governments have continued to maintain peaceful relations it seems that not much has actually changed among the people. The attitudes are well summarized by Shani Cooper-Zubida, the spokeswoman of the Israeli embassy in Egypt, 'We have good relations regarding political issues, but when it comes to cultural affairs it is a little tougher,' she said. "It has been 30 years since Sadat came to Israel to try to break down the wall of ignorance and hate between our countries, and he was successful in certain respects. But there are still some bricks in the wall that are still standing, and one of them is cultural relations"<sup>(43)</sup>.

Since Egypt became the first Arab state to make peace with Israel, the two states have exchanged ambassadors, cooperated in security issues, and increased trade. Yet for many Egyptians, the war has migrated to the cultural arena, including boycotts of Israeli cultural events and criticism of Egyptians who make cultural normalization with Israel, Egypt's cultural minister Farouk Hosny, a minister for 22 years has refused to visit Israel and threatened to burn any Israeli books he found in Alexandria library. Every year, organizers of Cairo film festival refuse to allow Israel to participate in this event. When the Israeli center for research and information translated Alaa al- Aswany's novel "the Yacoubian building" al- Aswany decided to sue the center because he is opposed to cultural normalization with Israel<sup>(44)</sup>.

While there are no laws that prevent cultural normalization between Egypt and Israel, cultural interactions are few, and those who travel or work with Israelis are harshly criticized or even ostracized by Egyptian society. Civil society institutions including unions and syndicates usually threaten journalists, academics, writers, publishers, singers and so on with a life time ban for those members who normalize with Israel, and all the above civil society institutions reject any cultural exchange with Israel. In short, only a handful of Egyptian artists, writers, and academics have traveled to Israel<sup>(45)</sup>.

In 2004, Egypt's Supreme Administrative Court upheld a ruling that ordered the country's interior ministry to revoke citizenship from Egyptian married to Israeli women. The ruling if implemental would strip 30,000 people of their citizenship. The aim of the ruling was to protect Egyptian youth and Egypt's

national security, the high anti- Israel sentiment in Egypt is the ground for such ruling<sup>(46)</sup>.

Indeed normalization has not been very successful between the two nations. In Egypt, while President Mubarak and his National Democratic Party support the treaty, the Camp David Accords do not receive popular support among the people or among any of Egypt's opposition political parties, especially the largest, the Muslim Brotherhood<sup>(47)</sup>. Many Egyptians claim they will not support cultural normalization as long as Israel is occupying Palestinian lands, a sentiment often echoed throughout the Arab world. This is supported by the fact that just 26.9% of Egyptians believed relations with Israel were good after the outbreak of the Intifada<sup>(48)</sup>.

Just one example of the cultural exchange problems ongoing between Egypt and Israel is a recent incident that took place at the American University of Cairo in 2007. Rumors began to spread around campus of the university opening an exchange program for students and professors with an Israeli university. As the rumors spread the disapproval over the idea became so widespread that the university president had to make a public denial about the plan to dismiss it. The rumors sparked large protests and outrage among Egyptian students and professors alike<sup>(49)</sup>. The fact that this cultural program, in the world of academia of all places, could not be completed is just one example of little has been accomplished from the Camp David Accords in the area of normalization. At the same time there have been small success stories in the area of normalization. Since Camp David, one area that has seen multiple examples of normalization is in agricultural research and technology. One example would be the formation of the Cooperative Arid Lands Agricultural Research Program, a joint effort between American, Israeli, and Egyptian universities and governmental Ministries of Agriculture<sup>(50)</sup>. A second positive example towards normalization is a recent deal struck between the two nations that will send natural gas from Egypt to Israel. The deal, planned to last 15 years, serves as a commitment between the two nations to peace in the future<sup>(51)</sup>. While these positive examples of trends towards normalization are encouraging, they are relatively small developments over a long period of time. There is still much work to be done towards normalization; while much progress has been made on the economic front there is still relatively little cultural exchange. Greater cultural relations should propel normalization, allowing the people of Egypt and Israel to follow in the footsteps of their governments and make peace.

The third major outcome of the Camp David Accords is the way it has altered the role of Egypt in the Middle East. Despite the long history of

Egyptian leadership in Arab- Israeli conflict, all Arab state refused to follow Egypt's peace initiative. Camp David did not become the basis for a comprehensive peace agreement to the Arab Israel conflict.

The agreement changed dramatically the strategic situation of the Middle East, as it fundamentally changed the balance of power between Israel and the Arab states in the interest of Israel. Egypt's Separated deal with Israel caused a huge loss for Arabs in terms of the political, military, and strategic terms. The most powerful Arab state was removed from the battle field, thus decreasing the possibility of an Arab war against Israel, Israel then followed aggressive policies against Arabs<sup>(52)</sup>.

Prior to the signing of the Camp David Accords, Egypt was seen as the de facto leader of the Arab world, particularly militarily after the 1973 War with Israel. It had, at that time, the largest population of Arab country and the largest economy. Furthermore, the leadership of Nassir elevated the status of Egypt among the people of the Middle East. President Sadat knew however, when signing the Camp David Accords, that Egypt's role could not be sustained, its military needed to be replenished and the booming population was hindering the economy. Following the Camp David Accords, Egypt's regional role was greatly diminished. While many at the time believed Egypt would be able to use its position in the Arab World to promote peace in other Arab nations; instead, it was, expelled from the Arab League and excluded from Arab affairs. The lack of a leading nation in the Arab World created a vacuum that was filled by other Arab nations gaining prominence. As Egypt was no longer the military threat to Israel it once was Saddam Hussein and Iraq filled this void as the military leader of the Arab World. Saudi Arabia emerged as the economic leader boasting the largest economy in the region. While Egypt was no longer the strong leader of the Arab World it once was, that is not to say that it did not have a role at all. Instead as Egypt was welcomed back into the Arab community it was seen as a peacemaker and mediator.

Given its close ties to the United States following Camp David, Egypt was seen as having a strong influence in negotiations because it had the U.S. on its side.<sup>(53)</sup> Recently, Egypt has been vital in negotiations involving Hamas and Israel, as it is one of the only negotiating parties with relationships with them both. For example, Egypt played an instrumental role in negotiating the six-month "State of Calm" between Hamas and Israel in June 2008<sup>(54)</sup>. Also, Egypt will play a central role when the Arabs and Israelis start the negotiations on the, final states issues. If Egypt is able to continue its role as mediator in the Arab affairs it will play an important part in the makeup of the future of the Middle

East. This would be one of the more significant benefits to come out of the Camp David Accords.

## **Conclusion**

While the aforementioned outcomes are some of the more prominent developments to arise from the signing of the Camp David Accords, even the most basic outcomes cannot be overlooked. The first being the protection of human life, in the thirty years before Camp David Egypt and Israel had engaged in multiple wars, but in the thirty years since they have avoided all conflict, potentially saving numerous casualties. Even if the peace is only cold or on paper for now, the end of the loss of life on both sides is a positive development. Furthermore, the newly found sense of security for both countries that comes from the peace means that resources that previously had to be spent on the military or lost in wars, could now be diverted to domestic programs in dire need of funding.

The U.S. Foreign aid encouraged Egypt to make peace with Israel. It later served as a reward. It is a carrot needs to keep Egypt at peace with Israel, it is also required to support a regime that supports American interests in a critical region of the world. Moreover, American aid to Egypt is necessary for American leadership of the world as Americans promised prosperity for the peace Egyptians have made and will maintain in the post Mubark era; however, U.S. aid to Israel stands in contrast to the frequent use of aid as leverage to Egypt and it hinders the peace process.

While the U.S. aid to Egypt was to encourage its efforts in the peace process, the U.S. aid to Israel is doing the peace process a very bad service. Israel has invaded and occupied the territory of its neighbors, namely, the Palestinians, engaged in systematic human rights violations, refused to reconcile the national rights of the Palestinians that it exiles and continually subjugates, used American weapons against civilians, and ignored U.N. resolutions. U.S. support to Israel illustrates that Washington single out Israel for immunity from criticism, the outcome of such policy is the failure of peace in the region. Such double standards policy doesn't encourage peace or sustain U.S. credibility or its allies in the region including Egypt.

Finally, the Camp David Accords whether one considers them a success or a failure, were a necessary step to future peace agreements and served as a guide to the Oslo Accords and the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty. While not perfect, the Camp David Accords are invaluable for the lessons that can be learned from looking at its outcomes.

## اتفاقية كامب ديفيد: دروس وحقائق

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### ملخص

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تحليل تطور الأحداث منذ تسلم السادات السلطة عام 1970، وتخليه عن سياسات عبد الناصر وإقامة علاقات وثيقة مع الولايات المتحدة ومن ثم توقيع اتفاقية كامب ديفيد، هذه الدراسة ركزت بصورة خاصة على هذه الاتفاقية التاريخية للسلام وأثارها الاقتصادية والثقافية والسياسية على مصر وإسرائيل بشكل خاص، والشرق الأوسط بشكل عام.

وقد بينت الدراسة أن اتفاقية كامب ديفيد كانت علامة فارقة في شؤون الشرق الأوسط، ولكن هذا الإنجاز يبقى مثار جدل في ظل عدم تحقيق اتفاق سلام شامل في الشرق الأوسط.

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